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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI
CHALLENGES TO PERMIT DECISIONS: THE
EPA'S INTERIM GUIDANCE
Maura Lynn Tierney'
"Environmental injustice"' refers to the theory that racial minorities
and residents of low-income neighborhoods suffer discrimination be-
cause they do not receive adequate environmental protection and there-
fore must bear a disproportionate burden of hazardous facilities and
projects Environmental justice activists argue that the racism and clas-
sism of environmental organizations and state and local agencies system-
atically provide privileged white communities greater environmental pro-
tection than poor black communities.3 In contrast to the present national
activism of the civil rights movement, the environmental justice move-
ment is primarily the result of grassroots organization.'
'J.D., May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See Deb Starkey et al., Environmental Justice: A Matter of Perspective, NAAG
NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., May 1997, at 3. The term "environmental injustice" is
often used interchangeably with the terms "environmental racism" and "environmental
inequality." See id. The terms, however, have different meanings and connotations. See
id. "Environmental racism" refers to policies and practices that have racially discrimina-
tory environmental effects. See id. "Environmental equity" refers to the belief that all
populations should bear proportional environmental pollution and health risks. See id.
"Environmental justice" is a broader term that encompasses the meaning of both "envi-
ronmental racism" and "environmental equality," and refers to equal protection from en-
vironmental burdens and the risks associated with pollution. See id. See generally Major
Willie A. Gunn, From the Landfill to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing
Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate Environmental Injustice, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227,
1231-36 (1996) (providing a detailed discussion of each of these terms).
2. See Terry L. Schnell & Kathleen J. Davies, The Increased Significance of Envi-
ronmental Justice in Facility Siting, Permitting, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 528 (July 3, 1998).
3. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3,8 (1998).
4. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environ-
mental Laws and "Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 226 (1997) (explaining how most of the
participation in the movement stems from community groups engaged in local action). Al-
though regional and national conferences help further the environmental justice move-
ment, the "heart of the movement remains in its grassroots activism." Id. at 228. For ex-
ample, in October, 1991, the People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit met in
Washington, D.C. and developed Principles of Environmental Justice to guide the grass-
roots movement. See Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Rede-
velopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 765
(1994). These Principles aim for community self-determination to promote protection of
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Environmental justice surged onto the civil rights scene in 1982 when
citizens in Warren County, North Carolina drew national attention by
organizing a protest against efforts to site a polychlorinated biphenyl
(PCB) disposal facility outside a predominantly black neighborhood.5
The citizens brought a complaint against the State of North Carolina and
the Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), arguing that the use of county land as a landfill for the disposal of
contaminated soil was a public nuisance, and the EPA's approval of the
site was defective, arbitrary, and capricious.' The Warren County citi-
human health. See id. at 766.
The grassroots environmental justice movement seeks to bridge traditional civil rights
activism with the mainstream environmental movement. See Gunn, supra note 1, at 1227.
From the civil rights movement, the environmental justice movement adopted the supposi-
tion that basic governmental institutions discriminate on the basis of race. See Gerald
Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning of a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & COM.
597, 598 (1996). The civil rights movement demonstrated "the extent to which the various
institutions of our society are contaminated with the vestiges of de jure and de facto sys-
tems of white supremacy" while the environmental justice movement revealed that "envi-
ronmental policy making seem[s] to exclude the interests of poor, non-white communi-
ties." Id. At the grassroots level, environmental justice gained support in minority
communities by focusing on the need to combine the issues of environmental activism with
the civil rights movement. See id. at 599. An early example of this initiative was the "Ur-
ban Environmental Conference," which discussed this approach based on the belief that
central city residents were neglected in the environmental protection movement. See id.
5. See Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 296 (1995). The beginning of the current environ-
mental justice movement has been traced to Warren County, although the movement was
alive in the 1960's. See Kaswan, supra note 4, at 225-26. Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), credited with being "the parent of
environmental justice litigation," was a challenge to the siting of a waste facility on civil
rights grounds. See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in
David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 523 (1994). In Bean, the plaintiff claimed that
the Texas Department of Health's decision to grant a permit to Southwestern Waste Man-
agement to operate a waste facility in a predominately African-American neighborhood
was based on racially motivated grounds. See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 675; Richard J. Laza-
rus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Pro-
tection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 831 (1993) (discussing the Bean case and the "pitfalls of
reliance on equal protection litigation theories").
Notably, before the development of environmental justice as a recognized movement,
minority communities had organized in opposition to the siting of waste facilities and for
clean-up of contaminated sites. See Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees,
and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environmental Justice Movement and Community
Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 25, 29-30 (1994) (describing
how grassroots organizing, national conferences, and new theories of litigation converged
to make the protest in Warren County a reality).
6. See Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 280 (E.D.N.C. 1981). In
Warren County, the first case against the state was litigated on public nuisance rather than
civil rights grounds. See id. at 280. At the time, Warren County had the highest percent-
age of African-Americans in North Carolina. See Adam Swartz, Environmental Justice: A
Survey of the Ailments of Environmental Racism, 2 HOWARD SCROLL: THE SOCIAL
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zens protested against the landfill after the court denied the injunction,
and police subsequently arrested more than four hundred African-
Americans.7 This campaign garnered the attention of national civil rights
groups8 and inspired grassroots organizations to challenge the inequita-
ble distribution of environmental hazards and to promote environmental
justice.9
JUSTICE REVIEW 47 (1994); Fisher, supra note 5, at 296 (discussing the landmark General
Accounting Office and United Church of Christ studies and the percentages of African-
Americans in the regions studied); see also Schnell & Davies, supra note 2, at 528 (de-
scribing the protest as the "seminal event" of the environmental justice movement).
The plaintiffs also argued that the approval of the site by the EPA was defective be-
cause it contained impermissible waivers of regulations and because the state failed to
prepare an adequate environmental impact statement (EIS). See Warren County, 528 F.
Supp. at 280. Generally, an EIS is a document, mandated by environmental legislation, in
which federal agencies set forth the environmental implications of their actions. See
STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 60-61
(1997). In an amendment to their complaint, the plaintiffs added a claim that the landfill
was prohibited by a county ordinance. See Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 280.
The court denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction. See Warren County, 528 F.
Supp. at 282, 296. The court held that: 1) the plaintiffs lacked standing under the North
Carolina statute to abate a public nuisance; 2) they lacked standing under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act; 3) the claim that the state failed to prepare an EIS was moot because
the statement was eventually filed; 4) the EPA's decision was not arbitrary and capricious;
5) the Warren County ordinance the plaintiffs based their claim upon was void because it
is preempted by the Toxic Substances Control Act; and 6) the filed EIS was not defective.
See id. at 282-96.
7. See NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10,
1982) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review); Fisher, supra note 5, at 296. The
citizens were arrested for participating in a civil disobedience campaign organized to keep
the landfill out of their predominately black community. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 296.
Among those arrested were two influential figures: Walter Fauntroy, the District of Co-
lumbia's delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives and Dr. Benjamin Chavis, the
head of the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial Justice. See id. at 296-97.
The Warren County campaign prompted the local chapter of the NAACP, along with
other citizens groups, to sue the state of North Carolina, the Administrator of the State
EPA, and the state Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. See Gorsuch, No. 82-
768-CIV-5, slip op. at 1; Lazarus, supra note 5, at 832. The NAACP sought a preliminary
injunction under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the State constitution, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5, slip op. at 2-3. Denying the
injunction, the court held that the decision was not racially motivated, and the plaintiffs
would not be irreparably injured because the state had taken steps to minimize harm. See
id. at 9-10 n.8; see also Gunn, supra note 1, at 1279 (discussing Gorsuch and the feasibility
of using equal protection law to address environmental injustice).
8. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 296 (discussing the involvement of the NAACP and
figures such as Walter Fauntroy and Benjamin Chavis). Also involved in the grassroots
campaign were groups such as the Sierra Club and the Urban League. See Torres, supra
note 4, at 601-02 (discussing the organizations involved and the participation of Benjamin
Chavis and Robert Bullard, a sociologist).
9. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 761-64 (discussing the aftermath of the Warren
County protest and the progression of the grassroots movement).
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Prompted by the Warren County protest, the United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) investigated the composition of southern
communities that surrounded the nation's four largest hazardous waste
landfills.'0 The GAO study identified a strong correlation between the
racial and socioeconomic make up of communities and the location of
landfill sites." For example, in the EPA's southeast region, the study
found that three out of four communities with landfills had populations
of 52% to 90% African-Americans, and that all of the communities
studied were overwhelmingly poor.1
2
Several years later, a national study published by the United Church of
Christ's Commission on Racial Justice (UCC) found that "[riace proved
to be the most significant among variables tested in association with the
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities."" The study examined
10. See Schnell & Davies, supra note 2, at 528. See generally GENERAL ACCr. OFF.,
GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING
COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. In 1975, the United States Commission
on Civil Rights declared that the EPA failed to ensure that minority complaints received
the EPA's attention. See Torres, supra note 4, at 599. The EPA responded that this re-
sponsibility was beyond its jurisdiction until William Reilly began to take these complaints
seriously during his tenure as Administrator. See id.
11. See Schnell & Davies, supra note 2, at 528. One of the issues raised by the GAO
Study was whether the discriminatory results were a product of intentional discrimination
or instead, caused by other social and market forces. See id. at 528-29. For example, a
study done by the University of Chicago concluded that waste disposal sites were located
disproportionately in minority communities because of economic reasons, not racism. See
Nelson Smith and David Graham, Environmental Justice and Underlying Societal Prob-
lems, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), at 10,568-69 (Nov. 1997) (discussing the Chicago
study).
12. See GAO STUDY, supra note 10, at 4; see also Fisher, supra note 5, at 297 (noting
the disproportionality reflected in the GAO Study). The study also found that the fourth
site was in an area that was only 38% African-American. See id. Within the four-mile ra-
dius, however, the population increased to between 69% and 92% African-American. See
id.; see also Audrey Wright, Note, Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Re-
viewing the Evidence on Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Leg-
islation, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1725, 1728-29 (1993) (discussing the GAO Study and the
Warren County protest).
13. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES at xiii (1987) [hereinafter UCC STUDY] (dis-
cussing the major findings of the study).
Other studies have challenged evidence that forms the basis of environmental justice ar-
guments. See Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1995). For example, a national study conducted by the Social and
Demographic Research Institute (SADRI) at the University of Massachusetts examined
the same facilities as the UCC Study and concluded that "there was no statistically signifi-
cant difference between the percentages of African-Americans or Hispanics" in areas of
locally undesirable land uses (LULUs). Id. at 2-3. Professor Been argues that the differ-
ent conclusions resulted from the use of different units of analysis. See id. at 3-4 (clarifying
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the demographic makeup of 415 localities that contained known com-
mercial hazardous waste facilities and found that poor people were more
14likely to live near these facilities than middle or upper class groups.
Communities with more than one such facility had three times the num-
ber of minorities as those without. 5 The report concluded that these in-
equities represented institutionalized forms of racism, and that the dis-
proportionate distribution of hazardous waste sites was based on race
and other socioeconomic factors in permitting and siting decisions, not
chance."
Environmental justice issues are a growing concern among national
organizations and civil rights groups.' 7 Litigants have begun therefore, to
use civil rights laws to address environmental justice issues, including Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 Title VI prohibits programs and
activities receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating on the
basis of race. 9 Environmental justice advocates have brought federal
civil rights complaints alleging that the disproportionate placement of
hazardous facilities within minority communities is the result of discrimi-
nation by state permitting programs that receive federal funding. ° In re-
sponse to the growing number of environmental justice complaints
brought under Title VI, in 1998, the EPA's Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
issued the Interim Guidance For Investigating Title VI Administrative
that the SADRI study examined census tracts while the UCC study examined zip codes).
14. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 297 (discussing the methodology of the UCC Study).
15. See id.
16. See UCC STUDY, supra note 13, at 23.
17. See Kaswan, supra note 4, at 228. For example, the Washington Office of Envi-
ronmental Justice and the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights' Environmental Justice
Project have become involved. See id. at 228 n.20.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d(7) (1994).
19. See id. § 2000d. The use of civil rights laws seems a natural progression for Afri-
can-American litigants who have historically used such legislation to combat racial injus-
tice. See Torres, supra note 4, at 601-03 (noting, however, that "the mechanical applica-
tion of past solutions" may be inappropriate in the context of environmental justice).
Federal and state environmental laws and the Constitution are also being used to fight
siting decisions. See Cole, supra note 5, at 526 (discussing a litigation strategy that includes
utilizing environmental laws that focus on procedures or that mandate public participa-
tion, civil rights laws including Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act, and Constitutional
claims based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
20. See Margaret Kriz, The Color of Poison, 28 NAT'L J. 1608, 1609-10 (1998). Mi-
nority groups asserting claims under Title VI have filed more than 50 petitions with the
EPA. See id. As of June, 1998, the EPA had accepted 15 of the complaints for investiga-
tion, dismissed or rejected 30, and was holding seven for consideration. See Vicki Ferstel,
Executive Order Draws Attention to New Concern, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), June 23,
1998, at 1A (describing a sampling of these cases).
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Complaints Challenging Permits (Interim Guidance)." The Interim
Guidance provides a framework for the investigation and processing of
Title VI administrative complaints alleging discriminatory impact re-
sulting from the issuance of permits.22 Far from settling the controversy
that the EPA designed it to address, the Interim Guidance has sparked
disagreement among state officials, business and industry groups, and
environmental justice advocates.23
This Comment first traces the events that led the EPA to issue the In-
terim Guidance, examining the increasing use of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act by litigants seeking environmental justice. Next, this Com-
ment discusses how the EPA's Interim Guidance addresses the relation-
ship between environmental justice and Title VI. Recognizing the need
to balance the interests of environmentalists with the advocates of urban
redevelopment, this Comment argues for revisions to the Interim Guid-
ance that would more effectively promote environmental justice while
considering other valuable competing interests.
I. THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LITIGATION AND THE EPA's
INTERIM GUIDANCE
Twelve years after the Warren County protest brought the concerns of
environmental justice to the attention of the general public, the Federal
Government began to seriously address the issue, and the President is-
sued an Executive order on environmental justice on February 11, 1994.24
21. See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U. S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS 2 (Feb. 4, 1998)
<http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevi.html> [hereinafter INTERIM GUIDANCE].
Congressional reaction to the Interim Guidance resulted in a rider to the agency's ap-
propriations bill that prevents the EPA from implementing the Interim Guidance beyond
the fifteen complaints pending as of October 21, 1998. See Department of Veteran Affairs
and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2496 (Oct. 21, 1998); Jennifer Silverman &
Cheryl Hogue, Limits to Civil Rights Guidance Included in Bill Approved by House
Funding Panel, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 516 (July 3, 1998). The bipartisan measure cuts
off funding until the agency changes the rules to reflect the input of cities, state regulators,
and industry. See David Mastio, Congress Jumps into the Fight, DET. NEWS, June 29,
1998, at A4. Authored by Representative Joseph Knollenberg (R-Mich.), the measure
attached to the bill authorizing the EPA's annual funding is aimed at blocking the EPA, at
least temporarily, from implementing this controversial policy. See id.
22. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 1.
23. See, e.g., Kriz, supra note 20, at 1610 (noting that industry groups argue that the
Interim Guidance is vague and too restrictive, while environmental activists argue that it is
not tough enough on state permitting and the protection of minority group interests).
24. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995) [hereinafter Executive Order]. The
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The EPA subsequently developed an Environmental Justice Strategy.
Then, using its statutory authority, the EPA promulgated Title VI regu-
lations." These three events are important because each signifies the
Federal Government's burgeoning commitment to the environmental
justice initiative and willingness to enforce firmly Title VI, prompting a
27
rise in Title VI litigation.
A. Federal Action: Executive Order No. 12,898 and the EPA's
Environmental Justice Strategy
The number of states passing environmental justice legislation 2' and
memorandum accompanying the order states that the
order is designed to focus Federal attention on the environmental and human
health conditions in minority communities and low-income communities with the
goal of achieving environmental justice ... [and] to promote nondiscrimination
in Federal programs substantially affecting human health and the environment,
and to provide minority communities and low-income communities access to
public information on, and an opportunity for public participation in, matters
relating to human health or the environment.
Memorandum on Environmental Justice, PUB. PAPERS 241, 241 (1994) [hereinafter Presi-
dential Memorandum].
25. OFFICE OF ENVTL. JUST., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DOC. No. 200-R-
95-002, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898 (1995) [here-
inafter EPA STRATEGY]. The Strategy is designed to help "'bring justice to Americans
who are suffering disproportionately .... We will develop strategies to ensure that low-
income and minority communities have access to information about their environment-
and that they have an opportunity to participate in shaping government policies that affect
their health and environment."' Id. at 2 (quoting EPA Administrator Carol Browner).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) (authorizing federal agencies to promulgate regu-
lations to implement Title VI); 40 C.F.R. § 7.10 (1998) (implementing Title VI for the
EPA). Notably, the EPA's traditional perspective has been altered considerably during
the Clinton Administration. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 313-15. Even as recently as 1975,
the OCR recognized that the essential function of the EPA was as a pollution abatement
agency, not an agency concerned with community development. See id. at 314 (explaining
that the OCR's role for most of its existence was to process employment discrimination
cases). In 1990, an EPA environmental taskforce chair indicated concern over coupling
civil rights with environmental enforcement and stated, "'[s]urprise, suprise: We have
these facilities near poor people. Look back 500 years and you'll find the same thing."'
Id. (footnote omitted).
27. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 314-15 (illustrating that the Government's commit-
ment to environmental justice is beginning to take effect throughout the Executive
branch).
28. See Torres, supra note 4, at 613. State legislation exists in the form of community
right-to-know statutes and statutes that directly address environmental justice and fair de-
cision-making. See id. at 613 n.43 (listing a representative sampling of state legislation);
Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Where Did All the Blue Skies Go?
Sustainability and Equity: The New Paradigm, 9 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 399, 424 n.88 (1994)
(listing 16 states that have enacted environmental justice legislation).
Florida includes a chapter in its civil rights laws entitled "Discrimination in the Treat-
ment of Persons; Minority Representation." See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 760.85 (West 1997
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the proposed legislative initiatives by Congress reflect the movement of
environmental justice toward the mainstream. 29 This legislative activity,
following the GAO and UCC studies, led President Clinton to issue Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12,898, which requires all federal agencies to consider
and address issues of environmental justice.30 Executive Order No.
12,898 emerged as a result of the executive branch's commitment to im-
prove the response of federal agencies to environmental justice con-
cerns.31 The order, entitled Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,32 directs
federal agencies to identify and address the trend of disproportionate ac-
cumulation of adverse environmental and health effects on minority and
low-income communities in their programs, policies, and activities.33
& Supp. 1999) (creating an Environmental Equity and Justice Commission "to examine
and determine the possible disproportionate and cumulative concentration of environ-
mental hazards in people of color and low-income communities"). Louisiana's statute
contains a provision on environmental justice, providing for the Department of Environ-
mental Quality "to examine and study the relationship between the emission of air pollut-
ants and the discharge of wastes by facilities located in or near residential areas." LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 2011.2 (West Supp. 1999).
29. See Torres, supra note 4, at 613 & n.44. For a collection of the proposed legisla-
tion, see Collin & Collin, supra note 28, at 423-24 & nn.85-87.
30. See Torres, supra note 4, at 614. Although subsequent studies have contested
whether disproportionate distribution of hazardous waste facilities was a result of dis-
crimination, the finding of the GAO and UCC studies gained sufficient credibility to war-
rant an Executive order addressing environmental justice. See Schnell & Davies, supra
note 2, at 528-29. The order has three important aspects, which are meant to assist agen-
cies in addressing environmental justice. See Torres, supra note 4, at 615-17. First, the or-
der seeks to "naturalize" a concern for environmental justice in agency action by expand-
ing the agency's mandate to address these concerns. See id. at 615-16. Second, the order
requires inter-agency cooperation in information gathering and formulation of problems.
See id. at 616. Finally, the order requires the development of an inter-agency "working
group" that would gather and assemble recommendations and comments from the public.
See id. at 617. President Clinton intended these three aspects, combined with the addi-
tional creation of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee by the EPA, to
bring about the requisite changes necessary to further the Administration's environmental
justice objectives. See id. at 615-17.
31. See Torres, supra note 4, at 614-15 (noting the order is designed to induce agen-
cies into changing their decision-making structures to accommodate environmental justice
issues and to incorporate those issues into their mission statement). The order grew out of
the Clinton Administration's concern over the fair enforcement of federal environmental
laws. See id. at 614-16.
32. 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995).
33. See id. The order calls for increasing public participation in environmental deci-
sion-making and for improving data and research collection of the populations affected by
environmental decisions. See id. § 860. In addition, the order requires agencies to develop
environmental justice strategies that promote enforcement of statutory laws affecting hu-
man health and the environment in minority and low-income communities and to identify
patterns of consumption of natural resources among these populations. See id. The Ex-
ecutive order also established the Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice
1284 [Vol. 48:1277
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Abiding by the order's requirements, the EPA issued its Environmental
Justice Strategy: Executive Order 12898 (Strategy) in April 1995. 34 The
EPA designed the Strategy to ensure the full integration of environ-
mental justice considerations into all agency activities.35
In addition to the Executive order and the resulting EPA Strategy, a
Presidential memorandum accompanying the order identified the impor-
tance of using environmental and civil rights statutes to address envi-
36
ronmental justice issues. It also directed federal agencies to comply
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act).37 The
memorandum, Executive order, and Strategy, however, do not elaborate
on the application of Title VI. The EPA had implemented regulations
explaining the implications of the Civil Rights Act on agency decisions.38
B. The EPA's Regulations Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
An Alternative to Equal Protection Claims that Provides a Cause of
Action Based on Disparate Impact
Activists began using Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in environmental
justice litigation in light of the difficulty of proving intentional discrimi-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause.3 9 Enacted on July 2, 1964,
(Working Group) to concentrate on the areas of research and health, outreach, data, en-
forcement and compliance, implementation, Native-Americans, guidance, and interagency
projects. See id. The agencies were required to identify and inform the Working Group of
their internal administrative process for developing an environmental justice strategy
within four months of the order and to provide the Working Group with a final strategy
within one year of the order. See id.
34. See EPA STRATEGY, supra note 25, at 1-3.
35. See id. at 2; see also Starkey et al., supra note 1, at 10-11 (discussing the five key
points of the Strategy: public participation; research; data collection and analysis; protec-
tion of Native Americans' indigenous environment; and enforcement and compliance of
environmental laws). The Strategy called for the creation of an Environmental Justice
Steering Committee and Policy Workshop, and a National Environmental Justice Advi-
sory Council to implement environmental justice activities and advise the EPA. See EPA
STRATEGY, supra note 25, at 2-3. These groups are in addition to those required by the
Executive order. See Schnell & Davies, supra note 2, at 529.
36. See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 24, at 241. The memorandum states
that "[e]nvironmental and civil rights statutes provide many opportunities to address envi-
ronmental hazards .. " Id.
37. See id. at 242.
38. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10-.35 (1998).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from denying any person
within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws); Fisher, supra note 5, at 316
(noting the lesser burden of proving "disparate impact" under Title VI). The most signifi-
cant limitation on the use of the Equal Protection Clause is that a successful action re-
quires proof of discriminatory intent. See id.; James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled:
Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 125, 149 (1994).
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some commentators describe the Civil Rights Act as the most significant
legislation passed in the twentieth century.4 Title VI of the Act forbids
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance from deny-
ing benefits or discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national ori-
gin.4' Although the language of Title VI does not specify whether proof
of discriminatory intent or impact is necessary, the Supreme Court held
in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New York 42 that Title
VI can be expanded to include disparate impact if agency regulations so
provide.4 ' Hence, the EPA regulations implementing Title VI expand
the original scope of the Act, allowing plaintiffs to bring Title VI claims
on the basis of disparate impact in addition to discriminatory intent.
A disparate impact claim asserts that, because of a facially neutral
policy, a disproportionate discriminatory effect on a protected group has
occurred.45 In Guardians, African-American and Hispanic members of
the New York City Police Department challenged the department's
"last-hired, first-fired" policy on Title VI grounds, arguing that it was
The Supreme Court defined the contours of equal protection litigation in two seminal
decisions: Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See Fisher, supra note 5, at 303-05
(noting that courts are reluctant to provide remedies for equal protection claims).
40. See THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED
RACIAL SEGREGATION at vii (Robert D. Loevy ed. 1997) [hereinafter PASSAGE OF THE
LAW]. The public widely supported the legislation and civil rights groups put aside their
internal differences to fight for the bill. See John G. Stewart, Independence and Control,
in PASSAGE OF THE LAW, supra, at 321, 323.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
42. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Prior to Guardians, case law suggested that proof of dis-
criminatory intent was required because Title VI was believed to incorporate the same
standards as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Professor Wil-
liam A. Kaplin, Civil Rights Law: Supplementary Cases and Materials 158-59 (1998) (un-
published course materials, on file with the Catholic University Law Review); cf INTERIM
GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination).
43. See Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592-93. Prior to Guardians, the Court held that
"the validity of a regulation promulgated under a general authorization provision such as §
602 of Tit. VI will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation."' Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (quoting Thorpe v. Hous-
ing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)) (footnote omitted). The Guardians
court relied on Lau in upholding disparate impact suits brought under Title VI. See
Guardians, 465 U.S. at 592 n.12. Disparate impact refers to the first type of basic claim
under Title VII. See Kaplin, supra note 42, at 95. Under Title VII, plaintiffs may assert a
disparate treatment claim arguing that the defendant intentionally treated him or her in a
discriminatory manner because of the plaintiff's race, sex, national origin, or religion. See
id.
44. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (1994) (stating that a "recipient shall not choose a site or
location of a facility that has the purpose or effect of" discriminating on the basis of race,
color, national origin, or sex) (emphasis added).
45. See Kaplin, supra note 42, at 95.
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discriminatory.46 The Court concluded that intentional discrimination is
not required under Title VI, and a plaintiff may prevail under a disparate
impact standard;47 however, only injunctive, non-compensatory relief is
permissible for unintentional discrimination.
The EPA has used the Guardians decision to formulate its Title VI
regulations, allowing for a disparate impact standard.49  In addition to
prohibiting programs and activities that receive EPA assistance from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex, the EPA
regulations incorporate the disparate impact standard by stating that a
"recipient shall not choose a site or location of a facility that has the pur-
pose or effect"' ° of discriminating against individuals protected under the
Act.5 Environmental justice advocates have used these regulations to
assert claims of disparate impact under Title VI.
52
46. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 585-86. The Civil Service Commission appointed ap-
plicants to the police department according to test scores achieved on an entry-level ex-
amination, causing African-Americans and Hispanics with lower test scores to be hired
later than similarly situated Caucasians. See id. Subsequently, when the department laid
off officers on a "last-hired last-fired" basis, those with the lowest scores were laid off first.
See id. Consequently, the Commission's appointment process disproportionately affected
the petitioners. See id.
47. See id. at 584 n.2 (explaining that the five Justices who agreed to reverse the court
of appeals decision did so for different reasons, and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Brennan agreed that the administrative regulations supplied the disparate impact stan-
dard). As evidenced by the disagreement among the Justices, it remains unclear whether a
disparate impact standard will be allowed if there are not applicable administrative regula-
tions.
48. See id. at 607. Therefore, after Guardians, plaintiffs do not have to prove dis-
criminatory intent under Title VI if agency regulations create an action for disparate im-
pact. See id. If a plaintiff is suing under regulations that prohibit disparate impact, he or
she can instead meet this lesser standard. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 319.
49. Cf. INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that Supreme Court rulings
authorize the EPA "to adopt regulations that prohibit discriminatory effects."); 40 C.F.R.
§ 7.35(b) (1998) (implementing regulations pertinent to Title VI).
50. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (emphasis added). The regulations also state that:
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or substantially im-
pairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to indi-
viduals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.
Id. § 7.35(b).
51. See id. § 7.35(b). The regulations prohibit discriminating in the service, benefit,
or aid provided in all programs and activities, restricting the enjoyment of any benefits
under programs funded by the EPA, and segregating in services or benefits. See id.
§ 7.35(a)(2)-(4).
52. See Ferstel, supra note 20, at 1A (discussing the application of civil rights law and
EPA regulations in environmental justice cases). Title VI and the EPA regulations com-
bine to give plaintiffs three legal options. See Colopy, supra note 39, at 156. Plaintiffs may
sue the funding agency, sue the discriminating recipient, or take an administrative route by
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In response to the growing number of complaints and uncertainty on
how to employ a disparate impact claim in the context of environmental
justice,53 the EPA issued the Interim Guidance.4 The Interim Guidance
assists officials in the EPA's OCR by providing an updated procedural
and policy framework for processing Title VI disparate impact com-
plaints in the environmental permitting context.
C. The Framework of the Interim Guidance and the Disparate Impact
Analysis
The Interim Guidance provides the OCR, the entity responsible for
processing Title VI administrative complaints, with basic procedural
steps for addressing the complaints. 6 First, the OCR determines, within
twenty days of acknowledging receipt, whether to reject or accept the
complaint." Second, if the complaint is accepted, the OCR conducts a
factual investigation to determine whether the issuance of the permit will
have a new disparate impact or add to an existing disparate impact on
the minority population. 8 Third, upon a conclusion that a significant
disparate impact will result, the Interim Guidance allows the recipient of
EPA funding to rebut the finding, propose a mitigation plan, or justify
the impact. 9 If the recipient fails to meet these requirements, the OCR
then notifies the recipient in writing that the EPA has made a prelimi-
filing a complaint with the funding agency. See id. Federal courts hearing Title VI claims
have applied a disparate impact analysis mirroring Title VII disparate impact jurispru-
dence. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 321.
53. See Ferstel, supra note 20, at 1A. As of July 1998, the EPA was investigating 15
environmental justice complaints filed under Title VI and was considering several others.
See In the News: Environmental Justice, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), at 10,393 (July
1998) [hereinafter Environmental Justice]. As of September 14, 1998, the number of envi-
ronmental justice complaints under review had grown to 26. See Environmental Justice:
State Commissioners Draft Document in Response to EPA Interim Guidance, 29 SOLID
WASTE REP. 302-03 (1998).
54. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 2.
55. See id. The actions addressed in the Interim Guidance include decisions to issue a
new permit, approve the modification of an existing permit, and renew a permit. See id. at
7-8.
56. See id. at 9-12 (providing the general framework for EPA analysis).
57. See id. at 4. A complaint will be accepted if it has "apparent merit." Id. at 6. A
properly pleaded complaint shall be made in writing, describe discriminatory intent, effect,
or both, be filed within 180 days of the permit decision, and identify the recipient of fed-
eral funds who allegedly committed the discriminatory acts. See id. at 7.
58. See id. at 5 (stating that if no valid claim is presented the complaint will be dis-
missed).
59. See id. (noting, however, that before this conclusion, the OCR will seek com-
ments on its preliminary analysis). Justification is the fourth step in the process. See id.
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nary finding of noncompliance that may result in revocation of funding.
60
If the recipient fails to respond to the preliminary finding or otherwise
refuses to comply, it receives written notice of a formal determination of
61noncompliance .6
These basic steps raise controversial issues regarding permitting re-
quirements and the legal requirements to bring a claim.62 In regard to
permitting requirements, the Interim Guidance includes a broad frame-
work for establishing a prima facie case for disparate impact, requires
permit applicants to consider demographics for their operating permits,
and allows permit challenges to be raised for new, modified, and renewal
permits after an original permit has already been issued.63 In regard to
legal requirements, the Interim Guidance shifts the ultimate burden of
proof in establishing a disparate impact to the permitting agency and
creates a private right of action.64 Plaintiffs may bring Title VI com-
plaints concurrently in federal court and before the administrative65
agency. Therefore, it is important to examine the procedures employed
60. See id. A copy of the notice is also sent to the grant award official and the Assis-
tant Attorney General for Civil Rights and may also include recommendations for volun-
tary compliance or information regarding negotiations as part of the fifth step. See id.
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(c)).
61. See id. at 6. The deadline for the recipient's response is 50 days from the receipt
of the preliminary finding. See id. The recipient may supply a written response demon-
strating why the OCR decision is incorrect or why voluntary compliance is unachievable.
See id. The recipient may comply voluntarily within 10 days after the receipt of the formal
determination of noncompliance or the OCR will initiate enforcement action as the sev-
enth step. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(e)). Copies of the formal determination are
sent to the award official and the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. See id.
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(d) (1994)). The Interim Guidance encourages dialogue to occur
throughout the process, and urges the OCR to continually pursue informal resolution (the
eighth and final step), wherever practical, to achieve a settlement in order to conserve the
EPA's investigative resources. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(2)). The Interim Guid-
ance mandates that, if the EPA has determined that discrimination occurred, and the state
fails to remedy the violation itself, the EPA must deny, annul, suspend, or terminate the
state's funding. See id. at 4. In addition, the EPA may refer the issue to the United States
Department of Justice. See id.
62. See Jeffrey Gracer, Taking Environmental Justice Claims Seriously, 28 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), at 10,373-75 (July 1998) (discussing controversial issues raised by the
Interim Guidance, such as the supplement of a private right of action and the shift of the
burden of proof in the prima facie case for disparate impact). This Comment's use of the
term "legal requirements" refers to general requirements within the legal system, while
the term "permitting requirements," although also "legal" because they are based upon
statutes, refers to the specific requirements imposed on those seeking permits.
63. See id. (including an impact on the analysis of justification and mitigation meas-
ures).
64. See id.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) (allowing enforcement by "any other means
authorized by law"); Kaplin, supra note 42, at 209 (discussing enforcement of Title VI).
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by the federal courts in analyzing environmental justice complaints.
1. Disparate Impact Analysis and the Burden of Proof The Title VII
Analogy
When plaintiffs bring civil rights challenges to permitting decisions in
federal court under Title VI, the court applies a disparate impact analy-
sis. 66 Within this analysis, an important issue arises: the burden of proof.
67
When analyzing the burden of proof in Title VI disparate impact cases,
courts analogize to Title VII case law because it specifically prohibits
disparate impact. 8
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.69 provides the paradigm for disparate impact
cases under Title VII.70 In Griggs, African-American employees brought
a class action suit under Title VII against their employer because he re-
quired them to either have a high school education or pass a standard-
ized general intelligence test in order to work or transfer to a different
job.7' A large number of African-American employees were conse-
66. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1331 (2d Cir. 1981). In the
event that a plaintiff brings an environmental justice complaint before the agency and is
not satisfied with the administrative ruling, the existence of a private right of action be-
comes a significant issue. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,374 (discussing Chester Resi-
dents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997)); discussion infra
Part I.C.2 (discussing the Chester decision). In addition, whether a plaintiff must first ex-
haust administrative remedies may also become a significant issue. See Gracer, supra note
62, at 10,374.
67. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375 (criticizing the Interim Guidance because it
improperly shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the permitting agency).
68. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 592
(1983).
69. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
70. See Kaplin, supra note 42, at 96.
71. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26. Neither standard was shown to be significantly
related to job performance, and the jobs the applicants sought had formerly been filled
exclusively by white employees. See id. at 426.
On July 2, 1965, the very day that Title VII became effective, the employer, Duke
Power Company, added a further requirement that employees in all departments other
than labor had to achieve a satisfactory score on two professional aptitude tests in addition
to possessing a high school education. See id. at 427-28. The employer argued that the
intelligence tests were permitted under § 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act, which authorized
the use of "professionally developed ability" tests not intended to discriminate on racial
grounds. Id. at 433 (internal quotations omitted). The Court, however, gave "great defer-
ence" to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines interpret-
ing § 703(h). Id. at 434. Consequently, the Griggs Court concluded that the EEOC
Guidelines expressed the will of Congress to allow testing measures and procedures so
long as they were demonstrated to be a reasonable measure of job performance. See id. at
434-36. The EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures define a "profession-
ally developed ability test" as one
which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or
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quently ineligible because of this requirement. Although the Supreme
Court agreed that the employer had no intent to discriminate against the
African-American employees, it concluded that those employment pro-
cedures that "operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability" are not permissible."
In Griggs, the Court constructed a model concerning who bears the
burden of proof in disparate impact claims. The Court required the
employees to show that a disparate impact resulted from a facially neu-
tral policy.75 The Court indicated that "[u]nder the Act, practices, proce-
dures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices., 76 The Court reasoned that Con-
gress did not intend Title VII "to guarantee a job to every person re-
gardless of qualifications." Therefore, the Court allowed the employer,
after the plaintiff established disparate impact, to show that the employ-
ment practice was related to job performance, a defense referred to as
78
the "business necessity" exception. In Griggs, the Court concluded that
the employer did not demonstrate that its employment practices bore a
class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a
chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of
jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or organization claiming
expertise in test preparation does not, without more, justify its use within the
meaning of Title VII.
Id. at 433 n.9 (quoting the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, issued
Aug. 24, 1966); see also 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333, 12,334 (Aug. 1, 1970) (promulgating EEOC
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures).
72. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429. In order to be lawful, such requirements must be rea-
sonably related to job performance. See id. at 436.
73. Id. at 432. The Court noted that "Congress has placed on the employer the bur-
den of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question." Id.
74. See id. (recognizing that the Act is focused on consequences of the employment
practices and not just the motivations, if any, of the employers).
75. See id. at 430.
76. Id. The Court concluded that the record demonstrated that white applicants
fared better with the employer's requirements than African-American applicants, thus
directly tracing the disparity to race. See id. at 430-31.
77. Id. at 430. The Court indicated that tests and other similar criteria may be per-
missible, but they must meet certain requirements. See id. at 430-31.
78. See id. at 431. The employer argued that its intelligence tests were permitted un-
der the Act, provided that professionally developed ability tests not intentionally designed
to discriminate were permissible. See id. at 433. The Court noted, however, that Congress
did not intend for these mechanisms to be used when they have a discriminatory impact
that cannot be overcome by establishing that they are reasonable measures related to job
performance. See id. at 436.
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relationship to successful job performance. 9 Consequently, because the
employees successfully established the presence of a disparate impact
and the employer was unable to meet its burden of justification, the
Court declared the education requirement discriminatory.8°
Following Griggs, the Court altered the burden of proof requirements
by redefining the business necessity exception. In Wards Cove Packing
Co., Inc. v. Atonio, "' cannery workers brought a Title VII action against
their employer, alleging a disparate impact resulting from discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices.82 The Ninth Circuit relied solely on the
employees' statistics that showed a disparity in the jobs and pay that
white workers held compared with minority workers in finding that the
plaintiffs met their prima facie burden of proof."3 The Supreme Court
concluded that, while statistics can satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof,
this evidence alone did not establish a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact." Instead, the Court required that, upon remand, the plaintiff-
employees must demonstrate a specific link between statistics and the
employer's actual employment practices." As opposed to Griggs, the
Wards Cove Court stated that the employer need not show that the em-
ployment practice is a business necessity to rebut a prima facie showing
of disparate impact." The Wards Cove Court only required the employer
to show that the practice was significantly linked to the employer's le-
gitimate goals.87 The Court also clarified that the "burden of persuasion
79. See id. at 431. Instead, the Court referred to the appellate court's indication that
the employment practices were adopted "without meaningful study of their relationship to
job-performance ability." Id.
80. See id. at 432-33.
81. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
82. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 646-48. Specifically, the respondents claimed that
minority workers were overrepresented in low-paying cannery jobs, while white employ-
ees occupied the non-cannery jobs that paid more and were described as "skilled." See id.
at 647-48.
83. See id. at 650.
84. See id. The Court stated that if there are no barriers discouraging minorities from
applying, "the percentage of nonwhite workers found in other positions in the employer's
labor force is irrelevant to the question of a prima facie statistical case of disparate im-
pact." Id. at 653.
85. See id. at 657. The Court justified this specific causation requirement as reason-
able, given that the plaintiffs have access to the employer's records under discovery rules.
See id. at 657-58.
86. See id. at 658. See also Thomas J. Piskorski & Michael A. Warner, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Overview and Analysis, 8 LAB. LAW. 9, 9 (1992) (discussing how the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 eased the plaintiff's burden of proof in disparate impact cases).
87. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (characterizing the business necessity defense as
a reasoned review of the justification employers undertake to prove legitimate practices).
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remains.., with the disparate-impact plaintiff" at all times. Therefore,
even if the defendant is unable to establish a (newly defined) business
necessity defense, he may still prevail if the plaintiffs are unable to offer
alternatives to reduce the disparity.9
Congress reacted quickly to the Wards Cove decision. In 1991, Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 199190 (1991 Act) which expressly
overturned Wards Cove.9' The 1991 Act states that it is a codification of
the business necessity defense and the definition of the term "job re-
lated." 92 The 1991 Act provides that the plaintiff may prevail either if the
employer fails to demonstrate that the practice is job related and consis-
tent with a business necessity, or if the employer refuses to adopt ade-
quate alternative practices as demonstrated by the plaintiff.93 The provi-
sions of the 1991 Act adopt the definitions and burdens enunciated in
Griggs as statutory requirements.94
Courts expanded these burden of proof issues in Title VII to Title VI
cases as illustrated by NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.9" In this case, the
Third Circuit applied a disparate impact "effects" test to a siting deci-
sion.9 The NAACP argued that the relocation of a medical facility from
the inner city to an outer suburban location violated Title VI.97 The court
88. Id. at 659. The Court in Wards Cove indicated that the plaintiff had the burden to
prove that alternative employment practices would also serve the employer's interests
without a negative effect. See id. at 660-61. The Court relied upon the rules in disparate
treatment cases for the burdens of persuasion and production. See id. at 659-60.
89. See id. at 660. The alternatives must be equally effective, however, in achieving
the employer's legitimate goals in light of the costs and other burdens associated with the
alternatives proposed. See id. at 661.
90. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
91. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 1-3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
Among other changes, the 1991 Act also created the right to a jury trial under Title VII
and allows for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in intentional discrimi-
nation cases. See id. § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-73; see also Piskorski & Warner, supra note
86, at 9-12 (discussing the purpose and effect of the 1991 Act).
92. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1074.
93. See id. § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074.
94. See id. § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071. The 1991 Act diminishes the protection afforded
to employers by the Wards Cove decision, making it more difficult for employers to im-
plement practices which adversely affect minorities. See Piskorski & Warner, supra note
86, at 12.
95. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
96. See id. at 1331-32.
97. See id. at 1324. The plaintiff organizations represented minority, handicapped,
and elderly persons. See id. The plaintiffs asserted claims under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107, as
well as the Civil Rights Act. See id. Their claims alleged both intentional discriminatory
treatment and disparate impact. See id.
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explained that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under Title VI
when he or she produces evidence of a "definite, measurable disparate
impact., 98 Assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case, the court in Medical Center shifted the burden of production
to the defendant to establish a substantial, legitimate justification for the
practices that caused the disparate impact.99 The court reasoned that the
burden on the defendant should remain consistent with that imposed un-
der Title VII for intentional discrimination'00 and concluded that the de-
fendant had produced "adequate evidence to justify" its relocation.' 1
Furthermore, Medical Center enunciated that, if the defendant sustains
his or her burden, the plaintiff may be allowed "to produce further evi-
dence consistent with the third step of demonstrating pretext that the
Supreme Court has mentioned in both intent and impact cases brought
under Title VII."'' 2 For example, the plaintiff may show that there are
alternative measures that serve the employer's legitimate interest with a
98. Id. at 1332.
99. See id. at 1332-33. The parties debated whether there should be a difference in
the defendant's burden when the claim is one of discriminatory impact rather than intent.
See id. at 1333. The plaintiffs argued that a defendant rebutting a prima facie case involv-
ing discriminatory impact is essentially presenting an affirmative defense, and thus, should
shoulder the burden of persuasion. See id. The court rejected this approach noting that
the same could be true for discriminatory impact cases. See id. The plaintiffs based their
argument on the theory that "in countering a prima facie case of discriminatory impact,
the defendant is presenting something in the nature of an affirmative defense that requires
shouldering the burden of persuasion." Id. The court, however, rejected this reasoning as
contrary to precedent, noting that "[o]ne could just as readily say in an intent case that the
necessity to prove a nondiscriminatory reason is an affirmative defense carrying a burden
of persuasion." Id.
100. See id. at 1336. The court asserted a number of reasons why there should be a
consistent burden on defendants. See id. at 1335-36. First, the Third Circuit contended
that it is "illogical to impose a heavier burden on a defendant in a case where a neutral
policy results in disparate impact than in one where the charge is unlawful animus." Id. at
1335. Second, the court could find no important interest that would justify imposing two
different burdens on the defendant in such cases. See id. Finally, the court found uni-
formity in procedural aspects of intent and impact cases to be highly desirable. See id. at
1336.
Thus, the defendant need only produce evidence to rebut the prima facie case, without
carrying the heavier burden of persuasion. See id. at 1333. In Medical Center, the defen-
dant rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case with evidence that the decision to locate the
facility was based upon a bona fide interest and that there was no alternative with a less
discriminatory impact. See id. at 1336. Upon rebuttal, however, the ultimate burden of
persuasion to prove illegal discrimination remains on the plaintiff. See id. at 1333. This is
significant because it establishes that the defendant's burden under Title VI and Title VII
are the same. See id. at 1336.
101. Id. at 1324.
102. Id. at 1336.
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less discriminatory effect.03 Therefore, the Court's analysis in Medical
Center shows that Title VI does not prohibit disparate impact per se, but
rather "forbids only those actions that have an 'unjustified' disparate im-
pact[,]" similar to previous Title VII jurisprudence.'O Whether an envi-
ronmental justice claim will undergo this legal analysis, however, de-
pends, in part, on whether a plaintiff is able to bring their claim in federal
court.
2. Private Right of Action: The Chester Decision
Generally, citizens cannot bring a challenge in federal court unless
Congress has manifested its intent to provide for a private right of action
by statute. Therefore, although Title VI does not explicitly create a
private right of action, under certain circumstances, the courts may none-
theless imply such a right.'°6 The Third Circuit, in Chester Residents Con-
cerned for Quality Living v. Seif,' 7 recently considered whether Title VI
confers a private right of action under the EPA's regulations even
though not expressly stated by Congress.'9
In Chester, a community group claimed that the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection violated the EPA's Title VI regula-
tions by granting a waste facility a permit to operate in a predominantly
minority neighborhood where four other facilities were already li-
censed.' Although the district court dismissed the suit, ruling that the
plaintiffs had no private right of action, the Third Circuit reversed."'
103. See id. at 1336 n.17.
104. Fisher, supra note 5, at 321.
105. See Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that if Con-
gress provides no federal remedy, a cause of action may only be brought in state court);
see also Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (concluding that
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not create or imply a private right of ac-
tion).
106. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)
(holding that an implied right of action exists under Title VI).
107. 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
108. See id. at 927.
109. See id. at 927 & n.1.
110. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413, 417
(E.D. Pa. 1996). The court reasoned that although there is an implied cause of action un-
der Title VI, there is not one for an allegation of discriminatory effect. See id.
111. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 937. Relying heavily on the Guardians decision, the
Third Circuit found support for a private right of action. See id. at 929. The Third Circuit
examined the written opinions that resulted from the Guardians decision and found that
five Justices agreed that injunctive and declarative relief is available in cases involving dis-
criminatory effects, and thus, concluded that there was implicit approval for a private right
of action under the regulations implementing Title VI. See id. at 929-30. The court ap-
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, but Pennsylvania
revoked the challenged permit, rendering the issue moot and thus, the
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to the Third
Circuit for dismissal."' Prospective litigants, therefore, remain uncertain
about their ability to bring private actions. " 3
plied a three-prong test to determine whether it was "appropriate to imply private rights
of action to enforce regulations" because its own precedent did not resolve the issue. Id.
at 933; see also infra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing the three-pronged test
derived from Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985)).
In addition, the Third Circuit held that citizens may bring the suit in federal court without
first exhausting the administrative remedies set forth in the EPA's regulations. See Ches-
ter, 132 F.3d at 934-36.
112. See Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living, 119 S. Ct. 22, 22-23
(1998) (mem.); see also John E. Milner & John Turner, Environmental Justice, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 478, 482 (1999); Peyton Sturges, Supreme Court Dismisses Chal-
lenge, Vacates Third Circuit Civil Rights Decision, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 849 (Aug. 21,
1998).
113. See Chester, 119 S. Ct. at 22-23; Milner & Turner, supra note 112, at 482 (noting
that "the Supreme Court's disposition of the case leaves the issue unresolved"). But see
INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 4 n.9 (relying on the Third Circuit decision in
Chester to conclude that individuals can file a private right of action without exhaustion of
administrative remedies). See generally infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Chester decision).
Allowing judicial review of a private right of action has implications regarding the ad-
ministrative process and the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. See
JOHN H. REESE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 660 (1995). The doctrine delays judicial review
based on the assumption that properly authorized remedies exist within the agency
thereby providing sufficient relief. See id. "The basic premise is that an aggrieved party
should be required to pursue his or her remedies within the agency as high as the agency
will permit before trying to jump into court." WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 382 (3d ed. 1997). Primarily, the doctrine is important because it
prevents premature judicial review and allows an agency to make decisions without inter-
ference from the courts. See id. at 381.
The agency's enabling legislation may specifically state an exhaustion requirement or
the court may utilize the doctrine in situations where the requirement is not clearly speci-
fied, but is necessary pursuant to "sound judicial discretion." See REESE, supra, at 661
(quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). The desirability of requiring
exhaustion exists due to several factors including the agency's expertise, the importance of
deferring to the autonomy of the agency, preventing judicial review of an incomplete rec-
ord, and promoting judicial economy. See Fox, supra, at 383. These factors were estab-
lished in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969). In addition, McKart illus-
trates that exhaustion may not be required if special circumstances are present. See 395
U.S. at 197. These circumstances include the agency's inability to grant the remedy
sought, the futility of the case before the agency, the potential for irreparable injury, and
the presence of a constitutional issue regarding the agency's structure. See Fox, supra, at
383 (listing factors); see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760, 765 (1975) (noting that
exhaustion is not necessary if the only issue is the constitutionality of the statute); McKart,
395 U.S. at 189-90 (discussing the potential burden upon the litigant should exhaustion be
required in the criminal context).
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II. THE EPA'S INTERIM GUIDANCE
The Presidential Executive order, the EPA's Environmental Justice
Strategy, and Title VI regulations foreshadowed the increasing impor-
tance of Title VI in environmental justice litigation. It remained unclear,
however, just how the Interim Guidance would affect the permitting pro-
cesses until the EPA issued it.114 When issued, the Interim Guidance re-
vealed the full implications of the environmental justice movement with
more clarity and much opposition.
The Interim Guidance implicates two specific areas: legal requirements
and permitting requirements."1 In terms of legal requirements, the In-
117
terim Guidance presents two topics of controversy. First, in contrast to
traditional Title VII jurisprudence, the Interim Guidance shifts the ulti-
mate burden of proving the necessity of a permit to the administrative
agency.' Second, the Interim Guidance allows individuals to file a pri-
vate right of action to enforce Title VI."9
Fueling the controversy regarding permitting requirements, the Interim
Guidance provides only a broad framework for establishing a prima facie
case for disparate impact, without defining the requirements that a plain-
tiff must meet."O Furthermore, the Interim Guidance expands the scope
of disparate impact consideration beyond the traditional technical re-
121quirements to now include demographics. In addition, the proposal
114. Cf States Negative on Interim Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 232 (May 22,
1998) (quoting EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner as acknowledging that, even with
the Interim Guidance, the issue of Title VI and environmental permits will not "be easily
resolved").
115. See id.
116. See David Sive & Lemuel M. Srolovic, Environmental Justice Issues Develop, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 26, 1998, at S1 (discussing the controversial legal and policy issues raised by the
Interim Guidance). See generally Gracer, supra note 62 (tracing the growing importance
of the clash between permitting decisions and Title VI claims).
117. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,374-75 (referring to provisions for a private right
of action and a shift in the ultimate burden of proof in the disparate impact analysis).
118. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 11-12; Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375
(noting that in traditional civil rights jurisprudence the initial and final burden is on the
party bringing the claim).
119. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 4; Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,374
(predicting that the private right of action provision will be a controversial aspect of the
Interim Guidance); see also supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the Chester decision).
120. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375. For example, the Interim Guidance does not
indicate what methodology or requirements will be utilized to assess disparity, an element
at the heart of a disparate impact analysis. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 9.
121. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 9-11 (providing a five step disparate
impact analysis that, in part, determines the racial and ethnic demographics of the affected
population using mapping technologies). Under the typical permitting process, "the per-
mit terms translate generally applicable standards and duties into source-specific emission
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allows plaintiffs to raise permit challenges for new, modified, and re-
newal permits after the EPA has already issued an original permit.2
Consequently, the Interim Guidance leaves unclear which justification
and mitigation measures the EPA will consider acceptable.'23
Opposition to the Interim Guidance has been widespread among state
and local governments, industries, and even among some environmental
justice advocates. State and local governments and industry groups
have argued that the Interim Guidance will result in additional lawsuits,
further clogging the courts. 25 These entities question the EPA's author-
ity to issue and administer the policies of the Interim Guidance.26
Moreover, state and local governments are urging the EPA to adopt
measures that create less conflict with local land-use laws.12  Accord-
limitations." David P. Novello, The New Clean Air Act Operating Permit Program: EPA's
Final Rules, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), at 10,080, 10,087 (Feb. 1993) (describing the
Clean Air Act's (CAA) Title V permit program and the EPA's final rules that implement
minimum requirements such as monitoring and record keeping for federally mandated
state permit programs). Permits have traditionally involved only technical requirements.
See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A
COURSEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 731-35 (1992) (summarizing the tradi-
tional way in which the CAA permitting program operates). For example, under the
CAA permit process, these standards are usually expressed as maximum concentrations of
a pollutant calculated as a number of parts per million for each pollutant. See id. at 731-
33. Based upon scientific data, the relevant state agency develops emission standards and
issues a draft permit, specifying a schedule of permissible emissions. See id. at 733 (ex-
plaining the CAA program and illustrating the process using Michigan's State Implemen-
tation Plan (SIP)). Demographic analysis is not a part of this process.
122. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 8 (discussing EPA's belief that "per-
mit modifications that reduce adverse impacts and improve the environmental operation
of the facility should be encouraged" and recognizing the agency's desire to discourage
mere administrative modifications).
123. See id. at 11-12. Justification and mitigation issues are a significant step in the
process. See id. The Interim Guidance indicated that the OCR will examine the "broader
governmental interests" involved in the permit, the seriousness of the disparate impact,
whether it is an initial or renewal permit, and whether the affected population can none-
theless benefit from the permit. Id. at 12. Traditionally, the plaintiff must show that other
measures without a prejudicial effect exist to serve the defendant's interests. See id. In
addition, the defendant must show that it has chosen the least discriminatory alternative.
See id.; see also NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1337 (3d Cir. 1981) (uphold-
ing a lower court decision to impose these standards). Justification issues and mitigation
measures also continue to be significant to the burden of proof analysis because the de-
fendant will have the opportunity to assert a substantial, legitimate interest to justify its
decision. See Interim Guidance, supra note 21, at 12 (indicating that mere compliance with
environmental regulations will be insufficient).
124. See Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: With EPA as Judge, Up Against the Envi-
ronmental Justice System, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at F1.
125. See Environmental Justice, supra note 53, at 10,393.
126. See Cheryl Hogue, Comments on Title VI Guidance Seek Clearer Definitions, In-
put from More Parties, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 234 (May 22, 1998).
127. See Mary Greczyn, EPA to Revisit Title VI, WASTE NEWS, Nov. 2, 1998, at 3. It
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ingly, these groups view the Interim Guidance as burdensome and likely
to undermine cooperative efforts.2 1 On the other hand, some environ-
mental justice and civil rights activists believe that the policy is insuffi-
cient and want the EPA to expand it to include other discriminatory
practices.12 A common concern involves the impact of the Interim Guid-
ance on the legal requirements traditionally used by federal courts.3
A. The Alteration of Traditional Legal Requirements Regarding Title VI
Claims: Burden of Proof Allocation and the Private Right of Action
1. Shifting the Burden of Proof to the Permitting Agency
Through the Interim Guidance, the EPA has shifted the ultimate bur-
den of proof away from the plaintiff (the permit challenger) as statutorily
adopted by Griggs.3' Instead, the Interim Guidance requires the defen-
dant (the permitting agency or permit applicant) to meet the final burden
of proof.132 The defendant must prove that the permit is necessary to ad-
vance a substantial and legitimate interest, as well as establish that there
are no less discriminatory alternatives.'33 The plaintiff need not prove
that a less discriminatory alternative would satisfy a legitimate business
appears the EPA has conceded that perhaps it should have sought more input from state
and local government and industry groups before proceeding with the Interim Guidance.
See id. Timothy Fields, Jr., then acting head of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, stated that
we felt compelled to tell people what our thinking was about those pending Title
VI complaints that have come in over the last five years .... But at the same
time we did not want to delay in an inordinate way an ability to make some deci-
sions about those cases that were pending.
Id. But see Hogue, supra note 126, at 234 (observing that there was a public comment pe-
riod where the EPA received approximately 100 submissions from various commentators
criticizing the proposed guidance).
128. See Skrzycki, supra note 124, at F1 (quoting state sources predicting that a mere
postcard could halt a valid permit); see also Hazardous Waste Firms Must Address People's
Siting Concern, Speaker Says, 20 HAZARDOUS WASTE NEws 339 (1998) [hereinafter
Hazardous Waste Firms] (discussing similar criticism of the Interim Guidance by the waste
industry).
129. See Environmental Justice, supra note 53, at 10,393 (noting that in addition to
pollutant exposure, the EPA should clarify that discrimination may include "increased
health risks, devalution of land, and decreased quality of life").
130. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375 (contending that EPA's disparate impact
theory remains "essentially untested" in the context of environmental permitting).
131. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 11; supra Part I.C.1 and accompanying
notes (analyzing Griggs).
132. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375 (criticizing this alteration).
133. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 11-12 (discussing justification and
mitigation analysis).
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interest.34
These burden of proof provisions have caused an uproar among state
and local permitting agencies, in part because the outcome of such cases
are often determined by which party bears the ultimate burden of proof,
increasing the likelihood that the permitting agency may end up as the
"loser."' 135 Interim Guidance opponents argue that because the signifi-
cance of mitigation measures and the justifications sufficient to rebut a
finding of disparate impact are unclear, the ability of a defendant to re-
but the finding of disparate impact will be more difficult. " '
2. A Private Right of Action: The Chester Decision as National Policy
Potential defendants to environmental justice challenges are also con-
cerned about the Interim Guidance's creation of a private right of ac-
tion.137 The Interim Guidance, relying on Chester, states that "individuals
may file a private right of action in court to enforce the nondiscrimina-
tion requirements in Title VI or the EPA's implementing regulations
without exhausting administrative remedies."'38  In Chester, the Third
Circuit determined that the Supreme Court's opinion in Guardians im-
plicitly approved a private right of action under Title VI discriminatory
effect regulations.'39 The Third Circuit used a three-prong test to deter-
mine if Title VI has an implied private right of action and, finding that all
134. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375.
135. See id.
136. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375; see also Skrzycki, supra note 124, at F4.
Michigan's Director of Environmental Quality suggested that "'[y]ou can do a very good
permit, but it only takes one person with a postcard to stop the whole thing'." Id.
137. Cf INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 4 (asserting the existence of a private
right of action); Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,374-75 (discussing concerns arising out of the
EPA's assertion that individuals may pursue a private right of action without exhausting
administrative remedies).
138. INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 4 (footnote omitted); see supra Part I.C.2
(discussing the private right of action resulting from the Chester decision). A spokes-
woman for the EPA has suggested that the recent Supreme Court ruling vacating Chester
will not impact the revised guidance. See Cheryl Hogue, Ability to File Legal Challenges to
Permits Under Civil Rights Law Remains Untested, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 892-93 (Aug.
28, 1998).
139. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 937 (3d
Cir. 1997); Plaintiffs Have Private Right of Action Alleging "Discriminatory Effect": Ches-
ter Residents Concerned for Quality Living et al. v. James M. Seif et al., 13 NAAG NAT'L
ENVTL. ENF. J., Feb. 1998, at 20, 21 [hereinafter Plaintiffs Have a Private Right of Action].
Although the issue was not addressed specifically by the Supreme Court in Guardians, the
Third Circuit inferred from that decision that a private right of action exists under section
601 of Title VI. See id. The Third Circuit also found support for its reasoning in decisions
by other circuits. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 936-37.
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140three prongs were met, held that it did. Specifically, the court found
that an implied right of action exists within the statute when: 1) the per-
mitting agency's rule is within the scope of the enabling statute,'41 2) the
statute properly permits the implication of a private right of action, 142 and
3) a private right of action furthers the purpose of the statute.43 In effect,
the Interim Guidance makes the Chester decision national policy, allow-
ing for a private right of action when plaintiffs allege discriminatory ef-
fects.1'" This policy is controversial, particularly because the Supreme
Court vacated the Chester decision1 45 and because in instances of racial
discrimination, courts traditionally allow a private right of action only in
cases involving discriminatory intent.
41
B. The Alterations to the Permitting Process
The Interim Guidance expands upon three crucial issues. First, the
Guidance explains the considerations involved in permitting decisions as
evidenced by the requirements for meeting a prima facie showing of dis-
147parate impact. In addition to traditional technical requirements, theInterim Guidance requires consideration of demographics for permitting
140. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 933-36; see also Plaintiffs Have a Private Right of Action,
supra note 139, at 21. This three-prong test is derived from Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985). See Chester, 132 F.3d at 933 (citing Polar-
oid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988) and quoting the test as stated in An-
gelastro).
141. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 933.
142. See id. at 933-36 (concluding that an implied cause of action is consistent with the
legislative history of the EPA regulations and the legislative scheme of Title VI).
143. See id.; see also Plaintiffs Have a Private Right of Action, supra note 139, at 22
(noting that the purpose of Title VI is to fight discrimination against those receiving fed-
eral funding and also that a private right of action would further these goals).
144. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,374.
145. See Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living, 119 S. Ct. 22, 22-23
(1998) (mem.).
146. See generally Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (setting forth when a pri-
vate right of action exists). The Interim Guidance nullifies the requirement that plaintiffs
first exhaust administrative remedies. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 4. Tra-
ditionally, under EPA regulations and because the EPA was seen as the "gatekeeper to
enforcement," challengers were first required to exhaust administrative remedies. Ches-
ter, 132 F.3d at 934. The ability of individuals filing environmental justice claims to bypass
administrative remedies has great practical significance. See Gracer, supra note 62, at
10,374. If siting and permit decisions can be challenged immediately and directly in fed-
eral court, then project developers have a greater incentive to seek early community sup-
port because they may be threatened by timely lawsuits in addition to traditional agency
administrative challenges. See id.
147. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 9-12; Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375.
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decisions.' Second, the Interim Guidance applies these considerations
to new permits and modified permits.149 Finally, the Interim Guidance
offers an expanded analysis of justification and mitigation issues.5°
1. Establishing the Prima Facie Case for Disparate Impact Under the
Interim Guidance: Determining What Constitutes a Disparate Impact
Based Upon the EPA's Broad Framework
The Interim Guidance establishes a disparate impact analysis as the ba-
sic framework for investigating affected communities. 5' The Interim
Guidance indicates that the EPA will base its analysis on the facts of
each case and the "totality of the circumstances.""' Consequently, es-
tablishing the prima facie case for disparate impact includes five basic
steps. 5' The first step is the identification of the affected population.
5 4
This "affected population is that which suffers the adverse impacts of the
permitted activity."' 5' Second, the demographics of the affected popula-
tion must be determined. " ' To determine the demographics, the OCR
will use demographic mapping technology,, generating data estimating
race/ethnicity and density near the facility or in the areas impacted ad-
versely by the facility." ' Third, the OCR determines the universe of ex-
isting facilities near the affected population and the total population af-
fected by the permit.5  This process involves ascertaining the
environmental impact of other permitted facilities in the area and their
affected populations The permit or project challenger must be able to
show that the facts support the effects of the universe of facilities, and
that together they present a disproportionate cumulative burden.' 6
148. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 10.
149. See id. at 8.
150. See id. at 11-12.
151. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 9-12 (listing the five basic steps in the
disparate impact analysis).
152. Id. at 9 (asserting that more than one technique may be used for evaluating dispa-
rate impact claims).
153. See id. at 9-12.
154. See id. at 9 (referring to the population that triggers the complaint).
155. Id. Considerations will usually be based upon the population's proximity to the
facility. See id.
156. See id. at 10.
157. See id. (discussing the methods and technologies used for conducting demo-
graphic analysis).
158. See id. at 10-11 (noting that there may be several universes of facilities affecting
the population, but that EPA will consider only those under the recipient's jurisdiction).
159. See id. at 11.
160. See id.
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Fourth, a disparate impact analysis must be conducted that, at a mini-
mum, compares the racial or ethnic characteristics of the affected popula-
• •• 161
tion to those of the non-affected population. This analysis compares
racial and minority groups to find if they are being impacted at a dispa-
rate rate.' The OCR will make other comparisons on a case-by-case ba-
sis."' Finally, the Interim Guidance specifies that the OCR will analyze
the significance of the disparity as well. 64
Critics argue that the method for determining whether a disparate im-
pact exists is too vague and that the Interim Guidance provides only a
broad framework with little explanation."' The Interim Guidance does
not indicate how the EPA will define the affected and non-affected
populations.'6 The Interim Guidance also does not define the methodol-
ogy for determining the significance of the statistical disparity.67
Acknowledging these concerns, the Science Advisory Board of the
EPA has issued a report that analyzes disproportionate impact method-
ologies for Title VI environmental justice challenges. 168 The report, fo-
161. See id. Paul Kamenar of the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), warns that
the disparate impact standard permits a challenger to demonstrate disparate impact just by
proving that a minority community is treated differently from other communities. See
Pamela Newman-Barnett, Mayors Join Critics of EPA Environmental Justice Rule, NAT'L
J. CONGRESS DAILY A.M., July 7, 1998, at 1. This disparate impact standard replaces
"discriminatory effect," which is thought to be a "tougher standard" for plaintiffs to meet.
See id.
162. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 11 (noting further that the EPA
"would expect the rates of impact for the affected population and comparison populations
to be relatively comparable under properly implemented programs").
163. See id. (stating that there is no single applicable formula or analysis applied).
164. See id. at 11-12 (indicating that justification and mitigation measures will be im-
portant focuses in this analysis).
165. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375 (discussing the problems associated with
vagueness that give rise to "substantial uncertainty"). See generally Cheryl Hogue, Han-
sen Suggests 'Template' to Guide States, Localities on Title VI Compliance, 29 Envtl. Rep.
(BNA), at 232 (May 22, 1998) (reporting that the legal requirements are not new, but
based upon Title VI, which has been in effect since 1964, according to Mark Gross, a com-
plaint adjudication officer for the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division).
166. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375 (noting, however, that the Interim Guidance
"refer[s] generally to proximity and contamination pathways").
167. See id. The methodology issue has generated considerable debate in the envi-
ronmental justice movement. See, e.g., Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism" and Lo-
cally Undesirable Land Uses: A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies,
8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121,137-43 (1997).
168. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DOc. NO. 99-007, AN SAB REPORT:
REVIEW OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT METHODOLOGIES, (1998) [hereinafter SAB
REPORT]; see also Cheryl Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps for EPA in Analyses of Dis-
proportionate Impact, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1310 (Oct. 30, 1998) (summarizing the
SAB Report and its recommendation that the "agency conduct disproportionate impact
analyses in a step-by-step fashion.").
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cusing on the scientific merits, reviewed two methodologies for evaluat-
ing the significance of statistical disparities: the Relative Burden Analysis
(RBA) and the Cumulative Outdoor Air Toxics Concentration Exposure
Methodology (COATCEM). 169 The methodologies are intended to be
used by the OCR "to generate information on substantial differences in
impact between populations from specific facilities, potential harm due
to such differential impacts, and an estimate of overall cumulative levels
of risks from multiple emitting sources in the area of concern."' 7 Upon
review, the SAB Integrated Human Exposure Committee (IHEC) found
positives and negatives to using each approach, with the RBA methodol-
ogy being easier to use and understand, and "the COATCEM methodol-
ogy [having] significant potential for future use.'' Although courts and
administrative agencies have experience in applying the disparate impact
theory, the theory's extension to the environmental justice context is un-
tested.'72
2. Including Demographic Considerations in Permit Decisions
Under the Interim Guidance, federal, state, and local governments are
required to consider racial demographics when granting permits to facili-
ties,' or risk being sued based for decisions that result in a disparate im-
pact on minority groups. The Interim Guidance also dramatically affects
environmental permitting systems because if any agency (state or local)
accepts federal funding, the Interim Guidance will apply to all programs
that the agency implements, regardless of whether a specific program re-
ceives the federal funds.74 State and local governments argue that this
pressure results in too much EPA control over local government permit-
169. See SAB REPORT, supra note 168, at 1.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1-2. Moving beyond the methodologies themselves, the IHEC suggested
among its recommendations to the EPA that "it is critical to maintain good communica-
tions and to convey information on the studies in an understandable and complete man-
ner, making sure that the uses and limitations of the methodologies are adequately ad-
dressed." Id. at 4.
172. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375 (noting that the disparate impact theory has
been primarily utilized by courts and administrative agencies in employment discrimina-
tion and fair lending cases rather than the environmental justice context).
173. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 9-11; see also Mary Greczyn, EPA
Guide Raising Ire, WASTE NEWS, at 1, Feb. 16, 1998. The INTERIM GUIDANCE stresses
the need for compliance with EPA's Title VI regulations as a condition of receiving fund-
ing under environmental programs grants. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 2-3.
The Interim Guidance explains that "[a]cceptance of EPA funding creates an obligation on
the recipient to comply with the regulations for as long as any EPA funding is extended"
as a contractual obligation. Id. at 3.
174. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 3.
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ting and land use decisions.175
State and local governments are alarmed by the Interim Guidance be-
cause it threatens programs aimed at bringing jobs and economic growth
to urban areas where poor and minority neighborhoods are located."'
The United States Conference of Mayors has unanimously indicated
strong opposition to the EPA policy as well.'77 They argue that the In-
175. See Hogue, supra note 126, at 234-35 (citing industry concern that the EPA is be-
coming too involved in decisions that should be left to state and local officials and quoting
the Western States Petroleum Association's warning that "'[f]ederal involvement in local
land use decisions would be precedent-setting"').
176. See State Agency Chiefs Ask EPA to Withdraw New Guidance on Civil Rights
Complaints, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 2531 (Apr. 3, 1998) [hereinafter State Agency
Chiefs]; David Mastio, EPA Shock Wave Far From Certain, DET. NEWS, June 29, 1998, at
Al [hereinafter EPA Shock Waves Far From Certain]. The Environmental Council of the
States has urged the EPA to withdraw the Interim Guidance and develop a policy "'that
will advance environmental equity concepts in a more workable fashion."' State Agency
Chiefs, supra, at 2531 (quoting the resolution by the Environmental Council of the States).
Members include the top environmental officials from 49 states, the District of Columbia,
and two U.S. territories. See id. The Council criticized the Interim Guidance for disrupt-
ing state management of permitting, and conflicting with land use policies and clean-up
and redevelopment efforts of urban areas. See id. The resolution also suggested that the
EPA avoid shifting permitting decisions to the Federal Government and allow states to
develop and implement programs to satisfy Title VI. See id. at 2532. Regulators in Michi-
gan are concerned that they will face a court challenge of their efforts to comply because
their state law does not allow them to reject pollution permits based on environmental jus-
tice issues. See EPA Shock Waves Far From Certain, supra, at Al.
Russell Harding, Chairman of the ECOS Working Group on Environmental Justice in-
dicated that states will have the additional burdens of refuting EPA findings that a permit
decision caused a disparate impact, and that merely demonstrating compliance with envi-
ronmental laws will not be sufficient to rebut the EPA's finding. See EPA Seeks Com-
ments on Requiring Civil Rights Test for State Permits, 29 SOLID WASTE REP. 60 (1998).
177. See Mayors Unanimously Join Archer, Oppose EPA Plan, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, June 23, 1998, at B4 [hereinafter Mayors Unanimously Join Archer]. The resolu-
tion was introduced by Mayor Dennis Archer at an annual meeting in Reno, Nevada. See
id. Opposition also included the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) who filed a peti-
tion claiming that all environmental justice complaints should be dismissed due to lack of
evidence of racial discrimination and that the Interim Guidance is "legally and proce-
durally flawed." Peyton M. Sturges, Washington Legal Foundation Asks EPA to Dismiss
Pending Civil Rights Complaints, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1350 (Nov. 6, 1998) (quoting
WLF petition). WLF claims that the Title VI regulations unconstitutionally adopt a dispa-
rate impact standard and because environmental justice complaints fail to show inten-
tional discrimination, they should be dismissed. See id. at 1350-51. In addition, the West-
ern Governors Association has voted unanimously to demand withdrawal of the Interim
Guidance. See David Mastio, Another Setback for EPA Policy, DET. NEWS, July 2, 1998,
at B1 (citing further opposition including the Environmental Council of the States, the Na-
tional Association of Black County Officials, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 10 state
attorneys general, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors); John Chambers, The Supreme
Court Has Agreed to Take Upon Issue That Has Stymied Regulators and Judges: Waste
Disposal Facilities Planned for Construction in Minority Communities, NAT'L L.J., June 22,
1998, at B6 (discussing, in part, criticism that the EPA may not have properly issued the
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terim Guidance will cripple economic revival of urban communities and
severely reduce job opportunities for minorities." Because the Interim
Guidance prevents facilities from moving into an urban area based on
demographics, these groups are concerned that urban communities will
be deprived of valuable, desirable job opportunities due to the potential
environmental impact.1
79
3. New and Modified Permits: Finality Concerns
The Interim Guidance requires that the EPA subject all new permits to
an environmental justice analysis, and analyzes similarly permit modifi-
cations and renewals.' 8° Specifically, the OCR will analyze permit modi-
fications resulting in a net increase of pollution for adverse impacts.' 1
The EPA, however, will only consider the effects of the modification, not
the facility impact as a whole. 8 In contrast, the EPA will treat permit
renewals as if they were applications for a new permit; thus, the agency
will look at the overall operation of a facility.183 This is particularly con-
troversial because a facility operating for many years in one area may
now face an environmental justice challenge based on the demographics
INTERIM GUIDANCE under the Administrative Procedure Act); see also U.S. Conference
of Mayors Calls on EPA to Suspend Guidance on Civil Rights, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at
469 (June 26, 1998) (discussing the concerns and desires and the U.S. Conference of May-
ors).
178. See Mayors Unanimously Join Archer, supra note 177, at B4.
179. See id. Similarly, others worry that the Interim Guidance will prevent redevelop-
ment of brownfields (abandoned industrial sites) or cause delay and additional costs due
to the uncertainty about facility permitting. See Hogue, supra note 126, at 236.
180. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 6-8. Generally, permitting programs
require permits for all new sources of pollution. See id. In addition, a facility must often
seek a permit for modified sources of pollutants if they meet the definition provided by
statute. See Novello, supra note 121, at 10,091. For example, under the CAA, a modified
permit is required for major stationary sources of air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7454,
7503 (1990); Novello, supra note 121, at 10,082. In these instances, a permit must be ob-
tained prior to construction or modification. See Novello, supra note 121, at 10,083. In
addition, application for renewal permits are often processed as if they were initial per-
mits, meaning that the emissions of the facility will be evaluated as if it were the first per-
mit they were issued. See 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(h) (1998); Novello, supra note 121, at 10,090.
181. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 8 (explaining that the OCR will not
reject the complaints without examining the circumstances).
182. See id. (providing that the complaint must allege impacts specifically associated
with the modification in the permit modification context, as opposed to the permit renewal
context).
183. See id. (discussing permit renewals generally). The Environmental Technology
Council argues that permit renewals and new permits should be treated differently be-
cause [t]he courts have long recognized that a company operating for a substantial pe-
riod of time under a validly issued permit has a vested property right.'" Hogue, supra note
126, at 236.
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of a community that might have changed since it first began operations.
'18
Industries are bothered by this approach because environmental justice
concerns are a more significant barrier for new facilities than existing fa-
cilities, and the Interim Guidance, in effect, treats permit renewals as if
they are applications for new facility permits.
Opponents to the Interim Guidance argue that it creates a separate
administrative process that may take place after the state issues a permit
if the state does not consider demographics before issuing the permit. '
Actually, the Interim Guidance merely provides a remedy for states that
have failed to meet Title VI requirements.'7 This aspect of the Interim
Guidance has received criticism because industry groups allege that the
permitting process lacks finality and predictability by allowing a chal-
lenge to ensue after the state has made a permitting decision.'8 Indus-
tries are also concerned that it will pose an economic threat by allowing
the EPA (or permitting organization) to demand additional changes or
withdrawal of the permit for environmental justice reasons. 89 Critics ar-
gue that this additional regulatory layer of permitting is burdensome and
184. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,374-75 (discussing the effect of the Interim Guid-
ance on permitting).
185. See id. at 10,375; Schnell & Davies, supra note 2, at 530-31. Modifications are
generally less controversial among industry advocates because in many cases, they involve
new pollution controls that will actually decrease environmental impacts. See Schnell &
Davies, supra note 2, at 530. Also, even if the modification allows increased pollution, the
net impact will likely be less than that from an entirely new facility. See id. In addition,
existing facilities are likely to employ residents from the surrounding community, contrib-
uting to its tax base, whereas new facilities hold only the possibility of jobs and tax reve-
nue. See id. Therefore, the community has a stake in the success of the existing facility,
and if the facility can demonstrate a reduction in emissions from new modifications that
result in no net disparate impact over time, then it will be viewed more favorably by the
community. See id.
186. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375. Commentators have suggested that if an
analysis of the community affected and the interests involved is done early in the permit-
ting process, Title VI concerns can be addressed and potential solutions developed that
will serve the community's needs. See Paul Connolly, EPA Dismissed Complaint on Pro-
posed Steel Plant in Michigan, Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1351 (Nov. 6, 1998) (expressing the
advice of the EPA through OCR Director Anne E. Goode).
187. See generally INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21 (assuming complaints will only
be brought when recipients of federal funds fail to meet regulatory requirements under
Title VI).
188. See Newman-Barnett, supra note 161, at 1. Industry groups worry that this will
pose an economic threat because the challenges will not end after the permitting decision
has been made. See id. By allowing intervention at any stage of the permitting process,
industrial groups are mostly concerned with the issue of finality and the economic effect
that this unpredictability will have on them. See id.
189. See id. For example, an industry may have already sunk large amounts of money
into the operation of a facility based on the issuance of the permit and the public participa-
tion process. See Hazardous Waste Firms, supra note 128, at 339.
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results in delays in the permitting process.19° Only recently have envi-
ronmental justice claims become high-profile cases impeding project de-
velopment and permit renewals. 9' Generally, environmental justice is-
sues had been addressed in task forces and policy formulations that have
had little impact on the regulated community.192
4. Mitigation and Justification: An Unclear Approach
A facility's justification for the siting decision and the mitigation meas-
ures (or alternatives) that are proposed are also important parts of the
Title VI process.'93 According to the Interim Guidance, the recipient will
190. See Ferstel, supra note 20, at 1A. In response to these criticisms, the EPA Ad-
ministrator, Carol M. Browner and the EPA Director of OCR, Anne E. Goode, have sug-
gested that state agencies can avoid environmental justice challenges by allowing more
citizen input in the permitting process. See id.
191. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,374-75. The first petition filed utilizing the EPA's
environmental justice Interim Guidance involves Shintech, Inc., a Texas-based subsidiary
of a Japanese conglomerate. See Lois Ember, Environmental Justice at Issue, CHEM. &
ENG'G NEWS, July 13, 1998, at 39; Kriz, supra note 20, at 1610. Shintech proposed build-
ing a polyvinyl chloride plastic factory in St. James Parish, Louisiana, a community com-
posed of mostly poor African-Americans. See Kriz, supra note 20, at 1610. Controversy
resulted within the community because some residents argued that the factory should be
built because of the jobs it would create, while others opposed the environmental hazards
the pollution would cause. See id. at 1611.
The EPA rejected the community's initial petition that alleged a violation under the
CAA. See Ferstel, supra note 20, at 1A. Administrator Browner then suggested that the
opponents file a claim under Title VI. See id. Shintech opponents did so, alleging that the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality violated Title VI by issuing the company
an air emission permit for the $700 million project. See id. The citizens claimed that the
proposed facility would result in a disproportionate health burden on the community,
compounding the industrial pollution problems that already exist there. See id. The com-
plaint alleged that there were already 13 chemical or petrochemical plants in the St. James
Parish area. See Ember, supra, at 39. However, the Shintech case became moot because
the company abandoned the project, choosing to operate a smaller factory in a predomi-
nately white town. See Lynette Clemetson, A Green Bottom Line, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2,
1998, at 4.
A similar case using the Interim Guidance procedures, yielded the same result for the
proposed business venture. Select Steel Corp. had proposed to build a mill in Flint,
Michigan under a permit issued by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.
See Paul Connolly, EPA Panel Upholds Flint Steel Mill Permit; Michigan Seeks Dismissal
of Complaint, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1119 (Oct. 2, 1998). Despite state approvals, an
environmental justice complaint was filed to appeal the permit. See id. Not long after, the
company abandoned the $175 million project. See Paul Connolly, Michigan Governor
Blames EPA Policy For Company Decision to Scrap Factory Plan, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA),
at 995 (Sept. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Connolly, Michigan Governor].
192. See Ferstel, supra note 20, at 1A (discussing the current trends in environmental
justice).
193. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 11-12 (noting that "mitigation meas-
ures should be considered as less discriminatory alternatives, including additional permit
conditions" which would reduce adverse disparate impacts). This step of the EPA's analy-
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have the opportunity to justify the permitting decision based on "sub-
stantial, legitimate interests."' 94 Determining whether the justification is
sufficient will depend on the facts of the case.195 A mere demonstration
that a facility meets the applicable environmental regulation require-
ments will not be, however, sufficient justification.'96 Among the factors
that may be considered are the seriousness of the disparate impact,
whether a renewal or a new permit is involved, and whether the articu-
lated benefits will benefit the community subject to the Title VI com-
plaint. 97 In addition, the Interim Guidance states that if a practicable and
less discriminatory alternative exists, the EPA will not accept the justifi-
cation."' The Interim Guidance does not indicate, in establishing a prima
facie case, which justifications and mitigation measures will suffice to re-
but a finding of disparate impact, thus leaving the question open for de-
bate.'9
The Interim Guidance states that mitigation is an important focus of
the process despite the difficulty of justifying an "unmitigated," but dis-
parate, impact.2°° The Interim Guidance indicates that the EPA will con-
sider "supplemental mitigation projects," (SMPs) in combination with
other mitigation efforts.20' Although mitigation is a familiar concept, it is
unclear how the EPA or the courts will examine these measures in the
sis involves an arithmetic or statistical disparity calculation, which will be analyzed by ex-
perts to make a prima facie disparate impact finding, which the recipient of federal funds
has the opportunity to rebut. See id.
194. Id. at 12. This standard is analogous to the "bona fide interest" standard used in
Medical Center. See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981).
195. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 12.
196. See id. The Interim Guidance states that it will also consider "broader govern-
mental interests" because "the interests of a state or local environmental agency are nec-
essarily influenced and informed by the broader interest of the government." Id.
197. See id. Generally, a renewal permit with demonstrated benefits will weigh more
favorably than a new permit with more speculative benefits. See id.
198. See id.
199. See generally id.
200. Id. at 11-12. The Interim Guidance states that mitigation measures will be "an
important focus in the Title VI process, given the typical interest of recipients in avoiding
more draconian outcomes and the difficulty that many recipients will encounter in justify-
ing an 'unmitigated,' but nonetheless disparate, impact." Id. at 11. The Interim Guidance
suggests that public health and environmental consideration can be mitigated, and that the
EPA will evaluate the sufficiency of such mitigation in consultation with expert advice.
See id. at 11-12.
201. See id. at 11 (referring to the method used when "it is not possible or practicable
to mitigate sufficiently the public health or environmental impacts of a challenged per-
mit"). These SMPs may involve concerns raised by challengers of the permit that cannot
otherwise be addressed under Title VI. See id. at 11-12 (explaining that other considera-
tions may be outside those addressed by the permitting agency).
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environmental justice context.202 Opponents criticize the Interim Guid-
ance for failing to identify categories of mitigation measures that the
EPA would find acceptable and indicate how the agency will analyze al-
ternatives.20 ' For example, although the Guidance indicates that an of-
fered justification will be unacceptable if a less discriminatory alternative
exists, it does not suggest how to determine the adequacy of an alterna-
tive.4 Therefore, it is unclear to developers whether they may reject an
alternative based on legitimate business considerations such as cost, ac-
cess, site suitability, market factors, or availability of infrastructure.
Together, the vagueness concerning what the EPA will consider in ex-
amining alternatives, justifications, and mitigation measures results in
ambiguity that opponents argue is simply ineffective and inadequate
guidance.2 °6
C. Additional Opposition and Complaints
Other business groups and civil rights activists have criticisms that are
more general and suggestions regarding the Interim Guidance. For ex-
ample, state and local concerns question the legality of considering racial
or economic factors when reviewing permit applications. 2°7 Additionally,
critics argue over whether the EPA has the statutory authority to imple-
ment the Interim Guidance at all.208 Other commentators suggest that the
EPA offer guidance on how effectively to prevent Title VI challenges.2 6
They suggest that providing a proactive approach would avoid challenges
to permitting decisions altogether, allowing state and local agencies to
202. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375 (discussing the lack of analysis of these
measures in the environmental justice context). Businesses are concerned that mitigation
measures will pose requirements in addition to federal and state regulations. See Hogue,
supra note 126, at 235.
203. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375. For example, it is unclear whether job
training for residents or benefit payments for communities would be sufficient. See id;
Hogue, supra note 126, at 235 (quoting public comments on the Interim Guidance opining
that these measures would be insufficient, but that guidance on correcting disparate im-
pacts might be more helpful).
204. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 21, at 11-12. The Interim Guidance indicates
only that "less discriminatory alternatives should be equally effective in meeting the needs
addressed by the challenged practice." Id. at 12.
205. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375.
206. See Hogue, supra note 126, at 234-35.
207. See id. at 235. State and local agencies are also concerned about the dual implica-
tion of other types of permits when emission permits are also involved. See id. (describing
the city of Houston's request to limit the reach of the Interim Guidance to pollution con-
trol permits).
208. See id. at 237.
209. See id. at 235.
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resolve issues during the permitting process.
On the other hand, some environmental justice and civil rights activists
believe that the Interim Guidance is not stringent enough against envi-
ronmental injustice and want the EPA to expand the number of practices
that may indicate discrimination.2 1 For example, activists argue that in-
creased health risks, devaluation of land, and decreased quality of life are
additional forms of discrimination that the EPA's Interim Guidance
should specifically address. 2 Similarly, the National Environmental Jus-
tice Advisory Council (NEJAC) suggests that the EPA strengthen the
policy, not rescind it.213 NEJAC encourags the EPA to include activities
214beyond permitting, namely enforcement and cleanup. Furthermore,
commentators called for expansion of the Interim Guidance to include an
administrative process to review actions taken by the OCR on com-
plaints.2 ' Given the totality of the criticism, the EPA needs to consider
ways to address more effectively the competing interests involved before
it adopts a final guidance.
III. THE EPA's IMPENDING FINAL GUIDANCE: BALANCING
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WITH SUSTAINABLE URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT
The EPA's Interim Guidance fails to take into account some of the le-
gitimate concerns of industry and minority groups seeking redevelop-
ment of urban areas, as well as the concerns of local and state govern-S •• 216
ment regarding autonomy in land use decisions. Environmental justice
and industrial redevelopment advocates are at the forefront of the na-
tional environmental policy agenda and therefore, must take this oppor-
tunity to collaborate on strategies to improve the urban environment in a
manner consistent with environmental justice principles. It is necessary
210. See id. (quoting industry sources as saying that "'only those who participated in
the permit process should be allowed to file complaints"').
211. See Environmental Justice, supra note 53, at 10,393.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Hogue, supra note 126, at 236 (reporting that some commentators believe
that the Interim Guidance should apply to all of the offices of the EPA, not just the OCR).
There is some indication of dissension within the EPA over the Interim Guidance. See
Newman-Barnett, supra note 161, at 1.
215. See Hogue, supra note 126, at 236 (noting that the Center on Race, Poverty, and
the Environment argued that the Interim Guidance should be expanded to provide this
administrative review so that groups that feel their complaints were erroneously rejected
or dismissed will have another avenue of redress).
216. See id. at 235.
217. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 782 (concluding that "[t]his is a critical time for
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for the EPA to capture this collaboration in a final guidance that more
fairly balances environmental justice concerns with the need for sustain-
able urban redevelopment.
218
A. Balancing Interests with a Common Goal
Urban redevelopment advocates are generally public servants includ-
ing local and state officials, city planners, and local economic develop-
ment officials. 219  These advocates have focused on reducing cleanup
standards, limiting liability, streamlining government review, and in-
creasing government incentives to attract industry to urban areas.210 It
would be unfair to imply, however, that their goals do not include im-
provement of the urban environment.
Environmental justice advocates have recognized that redevelopment
can potentially lead to greater concentrations of adverse environmental
impacts in urban areas composed of mostly minority groups.12 ' Environ-
mental justice advocates argue that the burdens of environmental protec-
tion are disproportionate to the benefits received.222 Therefore, in order
to create a working relationship between these interests, it is important
for urban redevelopment advocates to understand a community's resis-
tance to development. 221 Similarly, environmental justice advocates must
recognize that loss of industry can have long-term ill effects on a com-
munity.224 Both groups need to focus on their common goal: improve-
ment of the quality of urban life. 225 The EPA must then incorporate both
visions into its final guidance.
The final guidance should recognize the need for equitable permitting
standards (which would carry over into siting decisions) and allow for
urban redevelopment and revitalization" and that environmental justice and industrial re-
development advocates can benefit from collaboration).
218. See generally, J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-
World Environmental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8
DUKE ENVTL. LAW & POL'Y F. 273 (1998) (providing an interesting discussion on mean-
ingful implementation of sustainable development policies).
219. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 706 n.1 (describing how these advocates are frus-
trated with the time and expense involved with environmental cleanup and have per-
suaded state legislators to create legislation that would facilitate urban redevelopment).
220. See id. at 738.
221. See id. at 757.
222. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 795.
223. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 757 (noting further how the impact of environ-
mental injustice on minority communities has resulted in political empowerment).
224. See Smith & Graham, supra note 11, at 10,568-69. Consequences of the loss of
large industry include the failure of small businesses relying on the industry, the decrease
of the tax base, and deterioration of infrastructure. See id.
225. See id. at 10,574.
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community involvement. Ideally, this would accommodate the legitimate
interests of developers and the economic benefits associated with devel-
opment.226 This approach would involve making difficult decisions re-
garding what environmental risks are acceptable.227 By allowing for
community involvement in the decision-making process, the community
228
affected would shape the decision.
In order for these groups to collaborate effectively, however, there
needs to be more effective use of measures such as the public participa-
tion process. 29 For example, redevelopment advocates should allow for
increased community involvement in the decision-making process at an
early stage, as called for in the Interim Guidance, and allow the input to
continue through project completion.230 With community involvement,
industrial redevelopment has a better chance of being successful, and will
provide an opportunity for a community to define its own identity.2 1 The
Interim Guidance should reflect the legitimacy of these efforts and not
ignore their import.
226. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 782 (arguing that both groups make compro-
mises in their positions to allow productive collaboration to occur).
227. See id. at 782.
228. See id. This issue of community involvement is demonstrated by the recent
events involving Shintech where some community members favor the decision to build the
factory in the community because of the resulting economic benefits. See Kriz, supra note
20, at 1610-11. The reality of Shintech is that urban redevelopment cannot be achieved
without some degree of environmental harm, but that the economic advantages of devel-
opment must be weighed with the environmental consequences. See supra note 191 (dis-
cussing the Shintech example).
229. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 782. Within the general permitting process,
there are traditionally stages where public participation is mandated. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.11
(1998). The regulations for the federal operating permit programs indicate various stages
where public participation is required, including notification of the opportunity to be put
on the mailing list for those affected by permitting decisions, in addition to all public no-
tices. See id. at §§ 71.11(d)(3)(i)(E)(3), 71.11(e), 71.11(h), 71.110). Generally, notice is
given to potentially affected communities early in the permit process so that they may par-
ticipate more fully and effectively. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 121, at 735. For exam-
ple, under the CAA, the regulations require public participation for the issuance of an ini-
tial permit in addition to notice of a "draft permit." See 40 C.F.R. § 70 (1998); Novello,
supra note 121, at 10,089. The EPA has also provided for a 30-day comment period and
an opportunity for an informal public hearing. See 40 C.F.R. § 70. However, the preamble
to the CAA final rules for the Title V permit program indicates that a state may not have
to hold a hearing in all instances. Specifically, a hearing is not required if the petitioner
only protests the source's location. See Novello, supra note 121, at 10,089. This may have
special relevance for Title VI challenges, which commonly challenge decisions regarding
facility location.
230. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 782-83 (noting that their input may be crucial to
the success of industrial redevelopment).
231. See id. (discussing the merits of communication between redevelopment advo-
cates and urban community groups).
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The inequities in environmental protection and enforcement have de-
veloped over a long time and one agency or program cannot solve this
problem alone.232 Thus, all perspectives must be represented in the de-
bate to improve the Interim Guidance and create a workable solution.
Therefore, understanding the concept of sustainable urban development
and encompassing the interests of environmental justice activists into
that concept will be an important part of devising the final guidance.
B. Sustainable Urban Redevelopment
The concept of sustainable development aims to direct economic ef-
forts toward increasing the quality of life while recognizing that the Earth
23has a finite capacity to accommodate people and development. The
theory recognizes that there is a moral obligation to consider the inter-
ests of future generations.34 The policy objective of sustainable devel-
opment requires integrating economic and environmental concerns,
thereby providing a conceptualization of their common goal.235 Stereo-
typically, some people believe that economic development and environ-
mental protection are incompatible.21 "The economic and social charac-
teristics of [minority] neighborhoods that make them vulnerable to
environmental dumping also create an urgent need for economic devel-
opment[,]" and thus, the principle of sustainable development can bring
these concerns together. z7
Only changes in values, processes, administrative policy, and laws will
institutionalize the principle of sustainable development. 38 Moreover,
"[p]olitical power must also be structured in ways that are conducive to
232. See supra text accompanying notes 1-16 (discussing the genesis of environmental
injustice).
233. See Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sustainable Development: Integrating Econom-
ics, Ecology, and Law, 31 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 261, 262-63 (1995). Commentators de-
fine sustainable development as "'development that meets the needs of the present with-
out compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."' Id. (quoting
the Brundtland Report prepared by the United Nations World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development).
234. See id.
235. See id. at 263.
236. See Godsil & Freeman, supra note 5, at 35. Godsil and Freeman propose an al-
ternative type of economic development called the "community-based economic devel-
opment" (CED) to overcome this stereotype. Id. CED focuses on the fact that environ-
mental justice principles are often consistent with land use debates over community
resources, encompassing both economic and political conflicts. See id.
237. Id.
238. See Smith, supra note 233, at 301. Changes in just one of these four areas will be
insufficient because each plays an important role in creating a viable sustainable develop-
ment policy. See id. at 301-03.
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sustainable development., ' 9 For example, the law must give decision-
making power to the level of government that is best able to make deci-
sions that bring about the goal of sustainable development .2  When the
EPA issues a final guidance, it should make sustainable development a
progressive movement rather than just a rhetorical value. Before the
EPA reaches this goal, however, it may first need to address other limita-
tions.
The final guidance must speak to the widespread phenomena that are
at the root of environmental inequities: namely, racist attitudes and false
stereotypes that result in the lack of political leverage and economic
power by racial minority groups.24' Those with political influence tend to
benefit from the lawmaking process and are more likely to have their
problems addressed.14 Because minority groups possess significantly less
power, particularly on the national level, they are more likely to bear un-
favorable societal burdens.24 EPA, Administrator Carol Browner ac-
knowledged the need for community input when she wrote: "[olur agen-
cies want to work with all who can contribute to finding solutions -
communities, State, Tribal, and local governments, business, and envi-
ronmental organizations. "2' If the EPA is able to follow up this state-
ment by providing all these groups with the opportunity to participate in
the formulation of the final guidance, perhaps it can achieve a more equi-
table and effective approach to environmental justice.
239. Id. at 304.
240. See id. This may involve allowing land-use decisions to be made at the local level
but with accountability under state law. See id. In addition, acquiring critical ecosystem
lands may need to be done at the national level with laws creating new institutions and
processes to implement sustainable development. See id.
241. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 806-07 (discussing the causes of environmental ineq-
uity). The debate over environmental justice also includes the assertion that the commu-
nity's demographics have changed since the siting, not necessarily with the intent to dis-
criminate. See Starkey et al., supra note 1, at 4. The impacts of siting decisions by
industries are often unintentional. See id. at 8. Environmental justice advocates should be
aware that "[c]haracterizing the private sector as impersonal and greedy establishes an
adversarial attitude that may impede progress in accomplishing environmental justice
goals and objectives." Id.; see also Kevin, supra note 167, at 142-43 (discussing factors
other than racism).
242. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 810 (concluding that the absence of political lever-
age is a primary cause of the inequity).
243. See id. at 808. These disproportionate burdens are exacerbated by the lack of
economic resources that cause minorities to suffer greater economic harm associated with
environmental protection. See id.
244. Carol M. Browner, Preface to EPA STRATEGY, supra note 25.
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C. Strategy and Policy Implications of the Interim Guidance
The Interim Guidance results in strategy and policy implications for
both environmental justice activists and industry groups. Environmental
justice claims are likely to remain a factor in permitting and siting deci-
sions for some time; and thus, developers will need to be sensitive to citi-
zen's legitimate concerns over disparate impacts.2 4 5 This will require fa-
cility owners to recognize when site proposals raise community concerns,
and will require community input and assistance of community relations
246
experts.
Industry groups would be wise to engage the public in discussion be-
fore locating a facility in their community. 24' By accepting community
input and allowing public involvement early in the process, businesses
can alleviate some of the tensions that result from lack of information
and insufficient communication.4 8 Providing for open debate will allow a
business to weigh the concerns of a community and avoid lawsuits that
result after construction has already begun.2 49 Having community par-
ticipation early on will head off problems before they begin and allow a
business to bow out early if the community response generates opposi-
tion that might create an economic cost barrier to development. Though
it seems obvious that most communities do not want a facility with envi-
ronmental risks, some may be willing to trade these risks for the resultant
economic opportunity25
°
Although the current movement primarily involves political and eco-
251nomic struggles for which lawsuits may not be the best remedy, chal-
lenging environmental equity in the courtroom has significant short-term
advantages. 2  Litigation aids in forming a community's identity and lift-
245. See Gracer, supra note 62, at 10,375.
246. See id. at 10,375-76.
247. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 783 (suggesting the importance of engaging the
local community for the success of a project).
248. See id. at 765, 783 (providing a basis for achieving the goal of improving the urban
environment).
249. See generally Anne K. No, Environmental Justice: Concentration on Education
and Public Participation as an Alternative Solution to Legislation, 20 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 373 (1996) (suggesting that increased public participation would
allow minority and low-income communities to have a more substantial party in the deci-
sion-making process).
250. See Newman-Barnett, supra note 161, at 8 (discussing the concern of brownfield
redevelopment supporters who worry that industry will not move into areas with high con-
centrations of minorities because of possible environmental justice complaints).
251. See Cole, supra note 5, at 541 (arguing that lawsuits are not the best means for
obtaining environmental justice).
252. See id. at 541-42 (noting that political ramifications and short-term benefits of liti-
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ing morale, raises the profile of environmental and civil rights groups,
and consequently builds political momentum by creating a rallying point
for public support While courts have yet to decide a Title VI envi-
ronmental justice case favorably, as more cases evolve, they have the po-
254
tential to educate the judiciary, which could result in a winning case.




The EPA has justly included the consideration of disparate effects on
minority communities through permitting decisions that disproportion-
ately locate hazardous facilities in minority and low-income communities.
Environmental justice is a laudable goal that the Interim Guidance seeks
to address, and although the Interim Guidance has some shortcomings, it
signifies a strong first step in a positive direction, which is needed for the
future success of environmental injustice claims.
While the EPA's Interim Guidance regarding environmental justice
makes a commendable attempt to address the growing trend of using Ti-
tle VI to combat disparate environmental impacts, it needs to balance
more effectively the interests involved. Both the process for formulating
the final guidance and the siting/permitting process itself need to involve
adequate public involvement by both industry and the community in or-
der to accommodate all interests involved. Specifically, the final guid-
ance should address the legitimate concerns raised by advocates for ur-
ban redevelopment and. the complaints made by local and state
governments that the EPA is interfering with their land use decisions. In
order to achieve a more equitable concept of environmental justice, it is
necessary that the final guidance represent all interests without compro-
mising the importance of environmental protection to a community's
economic and social health. The EPA can effectively achieve this goal
by incorporating the principle of sustainable urban redevelopment into
the final guidance.
gation include naming names, receiving publicity, gaining allies, and providing political
education).
253. See id. at 541.
254. See id. at 543 (analogizing to civil rights developments in school and facilities de-
segregation).
255. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 829 (arguing that the value of a lawsuit extends be-
yond a favorable decision).
Catholic University Law Review
